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ABSTRACT 
This study presents a stylized but insightful diagnostic of the problems limiting collective action in 
Ghanaian farmer-based organizations (FBOs). In our analysis, we use a structure-conduct-performance 
framework, econometrics, and new primary data for 500 FBOs collected through surveys and games. We 
find that most Ghanaian FBOs are inactive, failing to mobilize their members into any sort of collective 
action. To understand why this is so, we postulate that in rural Ghana, four typologies can be used to 
classify FBOs and to distinguish them on the basis of their membership structure and rules of conduct. 
We then show that FBOs fail to mobilize collective action whenever their structure and conduct are not 
aligned. In particular, misalignment leads mainly to problems of access to external credit and to a lesser 
extent to problems of internal cohesion. To maximize collective action, this study recommends the 
diversification of policy through recognizing the four different types of FBOs, each facing particular and 
to some extent opposing problems. 
Key words:  cooperatives, collective action, games, econometrics, Ghana 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A cooperative is essentially an organization owned and operated by a group of individuals for their 
mutual benefit. In fact, cooperatives can be defined as autonomous associations of people who get 
together voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through 
jointly owned and democratically controlled organizations (ICA 2007). The United Nations (UN) has 
declared 2012 the International Year of Cooperatives (IYC), highlighting the contribution of cooperatives 
to socioeconomic development, and in particular recognizing their impact on poverty reduction, 
employment generation, and social integration.
1 In fact, the UN has adopted a resolution that encourages 
itself, all member states, and all relevant stakeholders to take advantage of the IYC to raise awareness of 
the contribution that cooperatives can make to social and economic development and to promote their 
formation and growth. Arguably, the decision to make 2012 the IYC stems from the widespread 
perception that globalization has led to the intensification of market competition, increasing economic 
inequality, environmental degradation, and violations of human rights—forcing the poor, vulnerable, and 
oppressed to rediscover the importance of collective action to better sustain their livelihoods (Di Vico 
2008). In a growing number of developed economies, this societal perception is gradually being translated 
into policy, such as the Big Society policy adopted in the United Kingdom, which calls for power 
devolution from overly developed states and multinational corporations to local communities and 
collectivities.
2 In the developing world, similar policy reforms have also been strongly advocated. For 
example, Ostrom argues that power devolution in favor of collectivities can reduce inefficiencies 
associated with centralized governance as well as the environmental side effects and the social injustice 
produced by market-led economies.
3 
The renewed focus on the role of cooperatives in development coincides with the death of 
Oakeshott, champion of industrial cooperativism and author of the book The Case for Workers’ 
Cooperatives (1978). The work of Oakeshott is deeply rooted in the philosophy of Mill (1871), who first 
argued that cooperative production will be necessary to mitigate the uncontrolled selfishness encouraged 
by a society based on individual-level utilitarianism. According to Mill, a shift from investor-owned firms 
to organizations owned and operated by workers has the potential to transform the workplace from a 
setting characterized by antagonism to a “school of sympathy” that would enable workers to feel part of 
something greater. Mill ranks cooperative production and the emancipation of women as the two great 
changes that will regenerate society. Hence, if production were to become cooperative, a moral revolution 
would ensue. Mill also thought that cooperatives held an advantage over state-led organizations or other 
socialist institutions because they were able to compete against traditional firms. In fact, his criticism 
against socialism is that it undervalued competition as a useful stimulus to activity and efficiency. 
Oakeshott echoes Mill’s arguments in criticizing Marx and Engels (1848), who labeled cooperative 
organizations as “dwarfish” and “utopian ventures doomed to failure in a hostile sea of capitalism,” as 
well as Hardin’s (1968) proliberal dissertation on the tragedy of the commons. As a result, it remains 
unclear whether Oakeshott advances an alternative form of socialism or rather “workers’ capitalism.” 
What is clear is that Oakeshott pushed the notion that if workers became stakeholders, if the gap between 
management and labor vanished, and if effort and profit were shared for the common good, human beings 
would be happier, freer, and possibly better off. However, he also recognized that cooperatives were 
difficult to create and not always successful. In line with Marshall (1971) and Olson (1965), he 
acknowledged that the experience of workers’ co-ops was not altogether convincing but argued that this 
was not because such ventures were doomed but because their implementation was often misguided. In 
other words, Oakeshott endorsed the qualified optimism of Marshall, who suggested that strong emphasis 
                                                       
1 http://social.un.org/coopsyear/  
2 http://www.economist.com/node/18359920. Note that devolution is different from decentralization. Decentralization 
means transfer of power from the core to the periphery within the government structure; devolution means transfer of power from 
the state to the civil society (Meinzen-Dick 2009). 
3 IASC conference on the “Commons,” India, 2011.  
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must be put on conditions necessary for cooperative success and that the single most important condition 
is that of good leadership. 
In making his case for cooperatives, Oakeshott partly draws on his experience in Africa, where he 
actually worked to promote and support the development of farmers’ and other forms of cooperatives for 
almost a decade. In fact, recent studies (Develtere, Pollet, and Wanyama 2008; World Bank 2007) show 
that cooperatives, and in particular farmer-based organizations (FBOs), are long-standing and widespread 
on the African continent. Yet their overall performance remains highly contested (World Bank 2007; 
Rondot and Collion 2001), and it is often unclear what these organizations actually do in terms of 
collective activities, as many of them appear to be dormant, much like empty shells (Meinzen-Dick 2009). 
Available literature suggests that FBOs can fail to mobilize collective action due to either shirking (Hoff 
and Stiglitz 1993) or conflicts within the organization (Karantininis and Zago 2001). Clearly, the 
problems hindering collective action can vary significantly across space and time, increasing the 
complexity of the problems significantly and inducing researchers and policymakers to focus their 
attention on a particular problem (Ostrom 2004). As a result, problem-specific analyses and uniform or 
blanket policies tend to be pervasive, favoring collective action in some cases but discouraging it in 
others, or promoting collective initiatives today and suppressing them tomorrow. For this reason, Ostrom 
(2004) argues that further research is needed to look inside cooperative organizations, which should no 
longer be seen as “black boxes,” and investigate the complexity associated with collective action 
problems so as to identify diverse and selective support strategies. 
This study aims to do so by analyzing primary data on 500 Ghanaian FBOs collected through 
qualitative–quantitative surveys and games. Drawing upon the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
framework from industrial organization theory, we find that environments characterized by a functioning 
market, basic infrastructure, and critical mass (in terms of population size) are important pre-existing 
conditions for collective action. Yet, this study shows that there is no one direct intervention that can 
universally promote collective action. This is because collective action can be constrained by additional 
problems, with some FBOs facing internal issues of cohesion and others confronting access barriers to 
markets. Both problems are associated with poor leadership, defined by the lack of either motivation or 
capacity to keep organizational structure and conduct well aligned. While cohesion problems require the 
facilitation and coordination of participatory appraisals and learning within an FBO; access problems call 
for leaders to grant additional economic incentives as well as decisional authority and autonomy. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the study area and the methods used for data 
collection. In Section 3 we define an SCP framework amended to fit with existing cooperative theory. In 
Section 4 we describe the available data. Econometric results are presented and discussed in Section 5, 
and conclusions and policy implications are drawn in Section 6. 
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2.  STUDY AREA 
In rural Ghana, cooperative organizations can be traced back to precolonial times, when neighboring 
farmers used to provide each other with mutual support through exchange of labor (nnoboa), credit 
(susu), or both (Onumah et al. 2007; deGraft-Johnson 1958).
 In parallel with these indigenous collective 
practices, British colonialism was instrumental for the introduction and diffusion of formal cooperative 
organizations (Wanyama, Develtere, and Pollet 2008). However, during the colonial period as well as for 
most of the post-independence period, agricultural cooperatives became a means of power centralization, 
ensuring rural order and the extraction of natural resources and agricultural products for the European 
market (Wanyama, Develtere, and Pollet 2008; Onumah et al. 2007; Grischow 2006; Hussi et al. 1993). 
Not until the end of the 1980s did state-controlled cooperatives start to dissolve under growing global 
pressure for structural reforms toward liberalization and privatization. However, in some parts of Ghana, 
the dismantling of cooperatives has been tentative at best, while in others it has been hasty and seldom 
followed by the rise of viable agribusiness. Consequently, at the onset of the new millennium, Ghana is 
witnessing a new wave of rural cooperative organizations, commonly referred to as farmer-based 
organizations (FBOs). Although FBOs continue to be founded on cooperative principles (such as 
democratic decisionmaking based on the principle of one member, one vote), the name change was meant 
to indicate a break from the widely discredited and highly centralized cooperative model of the past. The 
rise of FBOs has in fact been partly driven by decentralized initiatives or even grassroots movements 
(Wanyama, Develtere, and Pollet 2008; Onumah et al. 2007; Grischow 2006; Hussi et al. 1993), inducing 
the Ghanaian government to deregulate FBOs through a revision of the long-standing national 
cooperative legislation (Tsekpo 2008). 
In 2010, about 10,000 rural organizations were counted in rural Ghana (Salifu, Francesconi, and 
Kolavalli 2010). The rapid rise of FBOs is mainly due to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
international organizations, and private investors who increasingly see rural collectivities as key partners 
to achieve agribusiness development and governance decentralization objectives (Salifu, Francesconi, and 
Kolavalli 2010). Between 2000 and 2007, the World Bank alone allocated more than US$9 million to the 
development of Ghanaian FBOs (AgSSIP 2007a,b,c). In addition to their increasing number, FBOs 
appear to be involved in an increasingly diverse range of collective activities. Ghana’s Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (MoFA) currently distinguishes between production, processing, marketing, and 
multipurpose FBOs (Salifu, Francesconi, and Kolavalli 2010). Considerable variability is also observed in 
terms of membership: some FBOs are composed of only women members; others, internally displaced 
minorities, religious brotherhoods, schoolmates, and so forth. Despite the growing complexity of Ghana’s 
rural cooperative movement, one-size-fits-all policies seem to remain widespread throughout the country. 
For example, Ghana’s Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) requires all FBOs willing to 
participate in its Millennium Challenge Account Program to adjust their size to approximately 50 
members, attend training sessions on cooperative business principles, register with the MoFA, open a 
collective bank account, develop a written constitution or bylaws, and develop a system for bookkeeping 
(financial records and meeting minutes; Salifu, Francesconi, and Kolavalli 2010).
4 Eligible FBOs are then 
granted subsidized inputs, equipment, and credit. 
To better understand organizational complexity at the local level and reconcile it with 
policymaking efforts, one of the authors collected data on 500 FBOs throughout rural Ghana (sample sites 
are depicted in Figure A.1 in the Appendix) during the first quarter of 2010. The sample was based on 
secondary information made available by governmental and nongovernmental agencies to reflect 
observed heterogeneity in the national population of FBOs. Therefore, the sample used in this study is not 
random and may not be fully representative of the actual population of Ghanaian FBOs and agricultural 
co-ops. Data were collected to maximize heterogeneity of agroecological zones, regional administrations, 
                                                       
4 MiDA is a joint program of the governments of Ghana and the United States (http://mida.gov.gh/site/).  
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district-level institutions, and infrastructure as well as organizations’ age, membership size, and principal 
collective activities undertaken. 
Primary data were collected at both the group and individual levels by a team of 17 students from 
three Ghanaian universities (Accra, Tamale, and Kumasi) and equipped with digital questionnaires and 
games uploaded onto smartphones.
5 Detailed quantitative and qualitative data on the history and current 
characteristics of FBOs were obtained through focus group discussions. Additional interviews and games 
were then conducted at the individual level with three randomly selected members from each FBO. Each 
of the three members was first asked, “What is the major problem faced by your organization?” and was 
subsequently asked to play a simple game combining classic risk and dictator game theories (Kugler et al. 
2007; Bolton, Katok, and Zwick 1998; Binswanger 1980). The rules of this game are explained in detail 
in Box A.1 (in the Appendix). Individual interviews and games were conducted to tease out members’ 
perceptions, motivations, and preferences in a standardized setting, minimizing external interference. 
   
                                                       
5 The software that was used to design and administer questionnaires and games is mQuest 
(http://www.cluetec.de/cms/front_content.php?idcat=72&lang=5).  
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3.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The framework applied in this study draws upon the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm 
pioneered by Bain (1951), which is a pillar of classic industrial organization theory. This framework 
states that the structure of an industry—given by the degree of concentration of market power among 
firms—determines whether the industry’s conduct is collusive (that is, equitable) or competitive 
(efficient), and this in turn explains the performance of the industry in terms of its value added and 
innovation rate (Kadiyali, Sudhir, and Rao 2001). In this study, we apply the SCP framework to clusters 
of farm households, namely FBOs, as opposed to industrial clusters of firms. To adapt the SCP 
framework to cooperative organizations, we use several different schools of thought including 
development and neo-institutional economics, sociology and anthropology, industrial organization and 
business management, and political science. 
Performance 
SCP models are commonly criticized for their choice of performance indicators, because organizational 
value added and innovation rates are somewhat hard to measure (Kadiyali, Sudhir, and Rao 2001). In 
rural producer organizations, quantitative performance indicators are particularly hard to come by. We 
therefore focus our discussion on more qualitative indicators of performance as identified in the literature. 
Following the approach developed by neo-institutional economists (Kirsten, Karaan, and Dorward 2009; 
Meinzen-Dick 2009; Varughese and Ostrom 2001), we take the stated incidence of collective action as a 
key qualitative indicator of organizational performance. In particular, we infer the presence or absence of 
collective action on the basis of the collective history narrated by each focus group involved in this study. 
Drawing from modern agribusiness theory (Cook and Chambers 2007), we distinguish collective histories 
characterized by rent-seeking or income-generating motives. This dichotomy in group behavior 
essentially aims at capturing whether or not members have been making a significant contribution to the 
common cause of the FBO.  
As explained by Cook, collective action essentially depends on whether group members put skin 
in the game.
6 Furthermore, following Ostrom’s (2004) recommendation, we also investigate 
organizational performance by looking at the incidence and types of collective action problems. Various 
dichotomies of collective action problems have been identified. Within development economics, the 
empirical work of Bernard et al. (2008b) in Senegal and Burkina Faso, for example, advances a 
distinction between community-oriented and market-oriented producer groups, with the former involved 
mainly in solving social issues and the latter mainly in overcoming access barriers to input procurement 
and output commercialization. A similar dichotomy is identified by Francesconi and Heerink (2010), who 
distinguish Ethiopian cooperative organizations on the basis of livelihood- and business-enhancing 
purposes. Finally, according to Ruben (1997), cooperative organizations are driven by either cost-saving 
or risk-sharing objectives, reflecting the existence of problems associated with, respectively, high 
transaction costs and limited economies of scale or risk aversion and limited economies of scope. Among 
political economists, Karantininis and Zago (2001) identify conflicts among members as a common 
reason for collective inaction, which typically results from the presence of free riders within a group. Hoff 
and Stiglitz (1993) instead consider shirking, typically resulting from a pervasive commitment to prevent 
any sort of free riding, as a major problem faced by cooperative organizations. 
   
                                                       
6 Cooperating out of Poverty, workshop organized by the French National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) and 
Wageningen University, Montpellier,France, 2007.  
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Structure and Conduct 
Neo-institutional economists (Varughese and Ostrom 2001) base the structure of cooperative 
organizations on the degree of heterogeneity in members’ characteristics, such as location, wealth, and 
sociocultural background. Agribusiness scholars (Cook and Chambers 2007) stress that heterogeneity in 
membership is more appropriately captured by differences in members’ socioeconomic preferences. In 
this study we take the latter approach and use games to measure members’ preferences regarding 
socioeconomic risk. We justify this by postulating that preferences may be a more precise measure of 
behavior than observable characteristics. In particular, the hypothesis emerging from recent work in the 
fields of development economics (Francesconi and Heerink 2010; Bernard and Spielman 2009) and 
political economy (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2010; Platteau 2007) is that community-level 
organizations tend to be highly homogeneous in rural Africa in terms of members’ characteristics 
(especially landholding) and preferences, which perpetuates kinship and tribalism. With regard to 
organizational conduct, development economists (World Bank 2007) emphasize that cooperative rules of 
conduct depend on classic equity–efficiency dilemmas. When equity preferences prevail, the value added 
by an organization (or equity capital) is equally distributed among members. When efficiency prevails, 
redistribution is instead proportional to individual effort. According to the World Bank (2007), African 
FBOs are typically founded on values of equity. In this study we also capture collective preferences for 
either equity or efficiency through games. 
An interesting parallel can be drawn between African FBOs and the traditional communities 
described in classic anthropological theory. According to Durkheim (1893), traditional communities are 
characterized by mechanic solidarity toward the next of kin, underpinning socioeconomic homogeneity. 
In contrast, modern communities are more heterogeneous because they are characterized by a more 
organic type of solidarity, based on the interdependence that arises from specialized work and 
professional complementarities. The application of this theory to producer cooperatives is presented by 
Sykuta and Cook (2001), who argue that these organizations usually evolve from traditional groups, in 
which residual claim rights are vaguely defined and equally allocated among members, into new-
generation cooperatives, in which residual claim rights are well defined and proportional to members’ 
patronage and investments. As such, given that African FBOs fall mainly in the traditional category, we 
can assume that something must be impeding their modernization.  
The evolution of a cooperative organization has been shown to comprise consecutive life cycles 
(Francesconi and Ruben 2008; Cook and Chambers 2007). After being established, cooperative 
organizations typically face a period of growth and good performance. However, over time, cooperative 
organizations tend to face a downturn associated with changes in either the external or the internal 
environment. External changes are associated mainly with increased competition in the marketplace, 
which induces more efficient conduct in cooperative organizations, increasing the likelihood of shirking. 
Internal changes are instead typically related to increased heterogeneity in members’ socioeconomic 
preferences, due to either expansion in membership or changes in members needs over time, which 
inevitably increases the likelihood of disagreement, tension, and conflict among members. This means 
that organizational evolution from traditional to modern depends on the willingness and capacity of 
cooperative leaders to confront external and internal changes that would compromise collective action. 
According to both neo-institutional economists (Varughese and Ostrom 2001) and modern agribusiness 
scholars (Cook and Chambers 2007), the role of leaders of cooperative organizations is essentially to find 
a way to keep the degree of heterogeneity in members’ socioeconomic preferences (structure) aligned 
with organizational conduct (equity or efficiency). 
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Environment 
A weakness of classic SCP models is that they tend to pool different firms under the same industry and 
disparate industrial clusters in the same sample, thereby affecting the overall meaningfulness of the 
results. To address this criticism stemming from the imposition of nonrandom clustering, researchers have 
commonly resorted to using regression models that include fixed effects (Boulding and Staelin 1993; 
Prescott, Kohlil, and Venkatraman 1986). Although fixed effects can control for some degree of error in 
comparing industries across space, the problem associated with the selection of firms into an industry 
remains arguably unresolved (Kadiyali, Sudhir, and Rao 2001). This, however, may not be the case for 
FBOs, for which membership is based on farmers’ self-selection. The selection of firms into an industry 
is not explicit, allowing for some degree of arbitrariness in the clustering process; however, the 
participation of farmers in an FBO is conditional upon their voluntary decision, thus minimizing the 
probability of random clustering.  
It follows that the introduction of fixed effects should be sufficient in our study to derive 
meaningful interpretations of results. In particular, we specify fixed effects on the basis of exogenous 
environmental factors that are relevant to collective action and cooperative policy. As postulated by 
twentieth-century organizational scholars (Sexton and Iskow 1988; Sexton 1986; Staatz 1987), collective 
action emerges to confront key market challenges faced by individual producers who retain limited 
bargaining power and economies of scale and scope. It follows that collective action may not 
spontaneously emerge in the context of missing markets, where subsistence strategies based on the 
consumption of own agricultural produce tend to prevail. This is expected to be the case in the many 
remote and disconnected rural areas of Africa, where collective action may be further constrained by low 
population density and thus the lack of critical mass, as explained by Granovetter (1978).  
Neo-institutional economists further emphasize that in the absence of external incentives, 
individuals do not always self-organize (Varughese and Ostrom 2001). This may be particularly true in 
rural Africa, where individuals may not be able to bear the unredeemable costs associated with 
establishing an organization (Kolavalli and Brewer 1999). Varughese and Ostrom (2001) also argue that 
organizational start-up depends not only on the provision of economic incentives but also on the degree of 
awareness, capacity, autonomy, and authority of local leaders. However, political economists (Platteau 
2004) suggest caution regarding governance strategies aimed at empowering local leaders, as these can 
exacerbate elite capture. Finally, Bruns and Bruns (2004) present several cases in which the necessary 
level of cohesion to start an organization was generated through community facilitators using a 
participatory approach. 
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4.  DATA DESCRIPTIVES 
Quantitative Data 
Quantitative data collected at the group level reveals that the average FBO in our sample is relatively 
small (38 members) and newly established (seven years old). However, these average characteristics hide 
significant variability—our sample includes also a few large (up to 500 members) and well-established 
(50 years of age) FBOs. In addition to these general characteristics, the quantitative data are also used to 
describe the environment in which Ghanaian FBOs operate (Table 4.1). First, we observe that the Eastern 
and Volta regions are the most represented in our sample. This is because FBOs are particularly 
concentrated in these regions, which have historically received most external support for organizational 
development (Salifu, Francesconi, and Kolavalli 2010). Second, we observe that although most FBOs (72 
percent) are based in districts with basic infrastructure (water pipelines, telephone networks, and 
electricity grids), only 34 percent of these operate in districts with a land market, that is, where land can 
be purchased and sold. Third, Table 4.1 also shows that the average Ghanaian FBO is found in a 
relatively small village (approximately 12,000 people) located 12 miles away from the closest MoFA 
office. Finally, we observe that the majority of FBOs in our sample were newly established—rather than 
re-established through the merger or division of former organizations—upon externally facilitated 
participatory appraisals and the provision of training on cooperative organization. Less than half of 
groups were established through the provision of economic incentives to local leaders. However, for the 
majority of groups, no authority or autonomy was vested in these leaders, particularly in terms of 
identification and selection of members. 
Table 4.1—Organizational environment 
Variable (499 observations)  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Greater Accra Region  0.08  0.28  0  1 
Central Region  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Volta Region  0.22  0.41  0  1 
Eastern Region  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Northern Region  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Brong Ahafo Region  0.12  0.33  0  1 
Existence of a land market within the district  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Existence of basic infrastructure at the district level  0.72  0.45  0  1 
Population size at the village level  12,288   57,908  6  700,000 
Distance from FBO to nearest MoFA office (miles)
7  11.73  14.42  0  200 
FBOs/co-ops established upon provision of incentives to the leader(s)  0.45  0.50  0  1 
FBOs/co-ops established upon provision of group training on 
cooperative principles  
0.62  0.49  0  1 
FBOs/co-ops established by members selected by the leader(s)  0.30  0.46  0  1 
FBOs/co-ops re-established from former organization(s)  0.18  9.38  0  1 
Source: Quantitative data collected for this study. 
   
                                                       
7 The distance is set to be equal to zero when the MoFA office and the FBO are located in the same town.  
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Qualitative Data 
Historical information recorded through focus group discussions shows that the average FBO in our 
sample engages in almost three collective activities and deals with two agricultural commodities. Maize is 
clearly the most important commodity. In fact, more than 50 percent of groups produce, process, or trade 
maize. Other important commodities include horticulture, root crops (cassava and yam), livestock, rice, 
export crops (palm oil, cocoa, cotton, and others), and fruits. In terms of collective activities, the majority 
of FBOs were involved in labor exchange (nnoboa) or rotating credit schemes (susu). In addition to these 
traditional collective activities, many FBOs also report involvement in collective farming, collective input 
procurement and output processing and commercialization, community work (village upkeep and 
infrastructure development), and external credit attainment. Hence, regarding the distinction made by 
Bernard et al. (2008b) and Francesconi and Heerink (2010) between community- and livelihood-oriented 
organizations and market-oriented organizations, we observe that the latter are far less prominent in our 
sample. Given these general characteristics, the qualitative data available to this study are used to define 
the performance of Ghanaian FBOs (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2—Organizational performance 
Qualitative Performance 
Indicators 
Options  Observatio
ns 
Percentage  Indicator 
Value 
History of collective action 
(as narrated by focus 
groups) 
Collective action  188  38%  1 
No collective action  311  62%  0 
Organizational problems 
(as perceived by members) 
All 3 members indicating cohesion 
problems  
35  7%  3 
2 members indicating cohesion problems   36  7%  2 
2 members indicating access problems  58  12%  1 
All 3 members indicating access problems  371  74%  0 
Source: Qualitative data collected for this study. 
Table 4.2 shows that according to the information collected on an FBO’s past, only 38 percent of 
organizations have so far managed to mobilize collective action, defined on the basis of member 
contributions (in cash or kind) to a common cause (skin in the game). This observation is in line with 
Meinzen-Dick (2009), who argues that most African cooperative organizations resemble empty shells. 
Member perceptions reveal that limited incidence of collective action can be attributed to a major 
problem faced by FBOs, which relates to barriers that prevent access to external credit, equipment, and 
inputs. Table 4.2 shows that for 371 of the FBOs in our sample, all members interviewed (three in each 
FBO) indicated the presence of access problems; and in 58 FBOs, two out of three members indicated the 
presence of similar problems of access. Thus, 86 percent of the FBOs appear to be mainly affected by 
problems of access to external resources, and the remaining 14 percent face problems of internal cohesion 
such as tension, disagreement, and eventually conflict among members or between members and leaders. 
These findings reinforce previous evidence highlighting the limited incidence of market-oriented 
organizations and echo the concerns of Bernard et al. (2008a) and Francesconi and Heerink (2010) 
regarding the lack of collective entrepreneurship in rural Africa. Using Ruben’s (1997) terminology, we 
can also conclude that rural organizations in our sample are expected to be far more successful in 
pursuing risk-sharing objectives than cost-saving objectives. 
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Game Outcomes 
Both organizational structure and conduct are derived from the outcomes of a risk–dictator game played 
with three randomly selected members from each FBO. The idea behind this game is to reproduce basic 
organizational dynamics in an artificial and standardized setting (see Box A.1 in the Appendix). In 
particular, we assume that collective rules of conduct are defined by individual preferences. In other 
words, the choice of a group with regard to equity or efficiency for the internal redistribution of the 
collective endowment (or equity capital) depends on whether the majority of individuals prefer equity or 
efficiency. To tease out such rules of conduct from a game setting, we hypothesize that preferences for 
sharing individual wealth (equity choice) or not (efficiency choice) are influenced by the heterogeneity in 
risk preferences plus a random effect (a coin toss). In the literature, the game described above is normally 
separated into a risk and a dictator game (Kugler et al. 2007; Bolton, Katok, and Zwick 1998; Binswanger 
1980). In combining risk and dictator games, we introduced a confounding effect associated with the fact 
that the propensity to share may be influenced by the size of participants’ own payoff relative to the given 
range of possible payoffs. However, this confounding effect is expected to add a collective dimension to 
classic risk and dictator games, which are instead designed to measure individual behavior. Hence, this 
confounding effect is interesting in and of itself and determined by the relationship between heterogeneity 
in members’ socioeconomic preferences and group conduct (that is, collective willingness to share). 
Game outcomes are depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of group-
level choices with regard to equity and efficiency options. In most cases we found a consensus among the 
group members involved in the game in expressing a preference for equity (value of 1); a consensus in 
adopting efficiency (value of zero) was the least observed. In some groups, consensus was not reached 
among the three members: either two members chose equity and one chose efficiency (value of 0.66), or 
two members chose efficiency and one chose equity (value of 0.33). Figure 4.2 describes the variance in 
risk preferences between the three members of each group involved in the game. The distribution 
presented in Figure 4.2 is skewed toward zero, showing that most groups display homogeneous risk 
preferences. These findings are in line with the evidence reported by the World Bank (2007) that remarks 
on the prevalence of equity and solidarity within African FBOs, as well as with numerous and recent 
studies (Francesconi and Heerink 2010; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2010; Bernard and Spielman 
2009; Platteau 2007) that emphasize the prevalence of homogeneous community organizations 
throughout rural Africa. 
Given the outcomes of the risk–dictator game described above, we can now distinguish four 
organizational types of groups on the basis of particular combinations of structure and conduct: (1) 
efficiency-based conduct (Figure 4.1: x < 0.5) and homogeneous structure (Figure 4.2: x ≤ 6); (2) equity-
based conduct (Figure 4.1: x > 0.5) and homogeneous structure (Figure 4.2: x ≤ 6); (3) efficiency-based 
conduct (Figure 4.1: x<0.5) and heterogeneous structure (Figure 4.2: x > 6); and (4) equity-based conduct 
(Figure 4.1: x>0.5) and heterogeneous structure (Figure 4.2: x > 6). The prevalence of each of these 
groups is given in Table 4.3. Drawing upon the work of Cook and Chambers (2007), Varughese and 
Ostrom (2001), and Durkheim (1893), we postulate that only types 2 and 3 are expected to be active 
because their structure and conduct are aligned. For the other groups, structure and conduct seems to be 
misaligned: The combination of equity-based conduct with a heterogeneous structure is expected to create 
problems of free riding and thus disincentives to invest in the common cause and compete in the 
marketplace. On the other hand, the combination of efficiency-based conduct with a homogeneous 
structure may create problems of cohesion. It is important to note that aligned groups are mainly groups 
with a homogeneous structure and equitable conduct, further stressing the argument that traditional 
organizations tend to prevail in rural Africa. Finally, Table 4.3 shows that misalignment due to the 
coexistence of equity-based conduct with a heterogeneous group structure is much more prevalent than 
misalignment due to efficiency-homogeneity combinations. This finding underscores the conclusion 
drawn in the previous section—that access problems are far more common than cohesion problems 
among Ghanaian FBOs.  
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Figure 4.1—Organizational conduct       Figure 4.2—Organizational structure 
   
 Source: Game data collected for this study.       Source: Game data collected for this study. 
Table 4.3—Organizational typologies 
 
Conduct 
Structure 
Homogeneous  Heterogeneous 
 
Efficiency 
Group 1  
N = 66 
Misaligned 
Group 3  
N = 31 
Aligned 
 
Equity 
Group 2  
N = 257 
Aligned 
Group 4  
N = 146 
Misaligned 
Source: Game data collected for this study. 
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5.  RESULTS 
The results from a probit regression of collective action performance of Ghanaian FBOs on structure–
conduct alignment or misalignment and the policy environment are given in Table 5.1. The table shows 
that collective action is more prevalent when organizational structure and conduct are aligned, that is, 
when structure is homogeneous and conduct is equitable (type 2 in our study) or when structure is 
heterogeneous and conduct is efficient (type 3 in our study). Our findings lend support to modern 
institutional (Varughese and Ostrom 2001) and organizational (Cook and Chambers 2007) theory, which 
stresses the importance of well-aligned structure and conduct for performance. Furthermore, we also 
refine this theory by validating the definition of organizational alignment given in the previous section. 
Our findings further emphasize that organizational alignment is defined by the coexistence of either a 
homogeneous structure and equity conduct or a heterogeneous structure and efficient conduct. 
Table 5.1—Probit regression explaining the incidence of collective action 
Variables  Collective action (1 = yes)
 
Aligned FBOs (types 2 and 3)  0.24 (0.12)**
a 
Greater Accra Region  0.02 (0.27) 
Central Region  –0.06 (0.26) 
Volta Region  0.31 (0.21) 
Eastern Region  –0.01 (0.21) 
Northern Region  0.12 (0.23) 
Existence of a land market within the district  0.23 (0.13)* 
Existence of basic infrastructure at the district level  0.32 (0.16)** 
FBO established upon provision of incentives to the leader(s)  –0.19 (0.13) 
FBO established upon provision of group training on cooperative principles   –0.17 (0.13) 
Distance from FBO to nearest MoFA office (miles)  –0.01 (0.01) 
Log of population size at the village level   0.07 (0.04)* 
FBO established by members selected by the leader(s)  0.10 (0.13) 
FBO re-established from former organization(s)  –0.12 (0.16) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.05 
Log-pseudo-likelihood  –312.39 
N  498 
Source: Primary data collected for this study. 
Notes: 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
** Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Table 5.1 also shows that collective action is more likely to occur in districts characterized by 
existing land markets and basic infrastructure as well as in larger villages. These findings are in line with 
conclusions drawn by twentieth-century organizational scholars (Sexton and Iskow 1988; Sexton 1986; 
Staatz 1987)—that collective action cannot be expected to emerge in missing or thin markets where 
subsistence through consumption of own agricultural produce may be the only realistic livelihood 
strategy. Finally, we find that none of the recall variables that capture the policy environment, which 
prevailed at the time of the establishment of Ghanaian FBOs, explain collective action. The limited role of 
policies prevalent at the time of establishment also explains the particularly modest goodness-of-fit of the 
regression. Clearly, our results (or lack of results) regarding the policy environment suggest that no single 
policy option can be expected to be universally conducive to collective action (see also Ostrom 2004). 
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Table 5.2 presents the results of two ordered logit regressions for the indicator values of cohesion 
and access problems faced by Ghanaian FBOs as given in Table 4.2. In this regression, the variable 
distinguishing aligned from misaligned groups is further decomposed to capture the effect of each 
organizational type on collective action problems. Hence, we run this regression twice, first including the 
two misaligned typologies (1 and 4) and then the two aligned ones (2 and 3). By doing so, we observe 
that aligned organizations are not significant in explaining collective problems, as expected. The two 
misaligned typologies are highly significant but with opposite signs. This means that the combination of 
homogeneous structure and efficient conduct raises problems of internal cohesion. On the other hand, 
FBOs characterized by a heterogeneous structure and equity-based conduct are more likely to face 
problems of access to external resources. These findings confirm and further streamline the hypothesis 
emerging from the work of Hoff and Stiglitz (1983) and Karantininis and Zago (2001), that collective 
action is commonly affected by shirking and conflicts. Conflicts of interest are expected to result from 
problems of free riding, typical for organizations characterized by equity conduct and heterogeneous 
structure. Conflicts are also expected to result in decreased market competitiveness, affecting access to 
external resources. On the other hand, shirking is expected to result from a lack of professional 
complementarities and incentives to collaborate, which are typical for organizations characterized by 
efficient conduct and homogeneous structure. Shirking is also expected to create organizational problems 
by affecting internal cohesion. 
Table 5.2—Ordered logit regression explaining cohesion and access problems in FBOs 
Variables  Collective action problem (0–3) 
0 = maximum access problem 
3 = maximum cohesion problem
 
Organizational type 1 (homogeneous structure, efficient conduct)  0.79 (0.30)**
a  — 
Organizational type 2 (homogeneous structure, equitable conduct)  —  0.08 (0.22) 
Organizational type 3 (heterogeneous structure, efficient conduct)  —  0.07 (0.29) 
Organizational type 4 (heterogeneous structure, equitable conduct)  –0.59 (0.27)**  — 
Greater Accra Region  1.43 (0.58)*  1.40 (0.55)** 
Central Region  1.59 (0.51)**  1.50 (0.49)** 
Volta Region  1.56 (0.48)**  1.39 (0.47)** 
Eastern Region  1.42 (0.47)**  1.26 (0.46)** 
Northern Region  0.66 (0.51)  0.67 (0.51) 
Existence of a land market within the district  –0.39 (0.24)*  –0.29 (0.24) 
Existence of basic infrastructure at the district level  –0.35 (0.26)  –0.33 (0.26) 
FBO established upon provision of incentives to the leader(s)  0.49 (0.25)*  0.43 (0.25)* 
FBO established upon provision of group training on cooperative principles   –0.63 (0.25)**  –0.57 (0.24) ** 
Distance from FBO to nearest MoFA office (miles)  –0.01(0.01)  –0.00 (0.01) 
FBO established by members selected by the leader(s)  0.90 (0.22)**  0.95 (0.22)** 
Log of population size at the village level  0.02 (0.01)  0.01 (0.07) 
FBO re-established from former organization(s)  0.53(0.27)*  0.52 (0.26)* 
Pseudo R-squared  0.12  0.10 
Log-pseudo-likelihood  –389.47  –397.41 
N  498  498 
Source: Primary data collected for this study. 
Notes:
 a Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
** Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 5.2 also shows that our recall variables capturing the policy environment that prevailed at 
the time of establishment of Ghanaian FBOs are significant in explaining the problems associated with 
collective action. Our findings suggest that problems of internal cohesion are found mainly in FBOs that 
were re-established on the base of a pre-existing organization, those that were granted economic 
incentives at the time of establishment, and those for which authority or autonomy was given to local 
leaders for establishment. In contrast, problems of cohesion are less prevalent in FBOs that were newly 
established upon participatory appraisals and the provision of training on cooperative principles. We find 
opposite results with regard to determinants of problems of access. Our results suggest that the 
empowerment of local leadership increases the likelihood of cohesion problems but decreases the 
incidence of access problems, while participatory appraisals and training increase the incidence of access 
problems and decrease the likelihood of cohesion problems. These findings reinforce conclusions drawn 
by Ostrom (2004), that different and opposing collective action problems require distinct coping 
strategies. More importantly, our results contribute to a specification—albeit rather general—of 
alternative policy options that can be implemented to address problems of collective action. In particular, 
we conclude that in FBOs characterized by access problems, equitable conduct, and heterogeneous 
structure, co-op leaders need to be empowered, allowing for a certain degree of elite capture. On the other 
hand, in FBOs characterized by cohesion problems, efficient conduct, and homogeneous structure, 
participatory learning and action can help to counteract excessive elite capture. Finally, it should be noted 
that most regional dummy variables included in the regression are significant and positive. These findings 
suggest that cohesion problems are particularly concentrated in the southern regions included in our 
sample (Greater Accra, Central, Eastern, and Volta), as compared with the Brong Ahafo (the regional 
dummy excluded from the regression) and Northern regions. In other words, this finding can also be 
interpreted in the sense that access problems increase as the distance between an FBO and Accra’s market 
increases. 
Overall, it is important to emphasize that we expect the econometric analyses presented in this 
section to not be subject to endogeneity bias, which commonly affects classic SCP models. As mentioned, 
the effects of structure, conduct, and governance on performance are usually difficult to identify in SCP 
models, especially when available data are obtained from a cross-section survey (Kadiyali, Sudhir, and 
Rao 2001), as is the case for this study. One solution that has been explored in the past is the use of 
instrumental variables. However, good instruments are difficult to find, and modern economic theory is 
raising growing concerns about the validity of instrumental variable approaches (Imbens 2009; Duflo, 
Glennerster, and Kremer 2007). Therefore, the approach used in this study to overcome the endogeneity 
problem is based on the use of both recall variables, reconstructing the process that led to the 
establishment of an organization and inferring collective structure and conduct from an artificial setting 
(the game), which is clearly different from the real organizational scenario. Clearly, the use of recall and 
game variables minimizes endogeneity problems on one hand but affects goodness of fit on the other. 
Therefore, the regressions presented above are characterized by generally low R-square. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Ghana’s largely rural population is to a significant extent organized into farmer-based organizations 
(FBOs), which are increasingly seen as important entry points for promoting agribusiness development 
and governance devolution. However, the message emerging from this study is that the optimism of will, 
arising from the UN’s declaration of 2012 as the International Year of Cooperatives, needs to be qualified 
by some pessimism of intellect. This study shows that, in fact, many if not most Ghanaian FBOs are 
small, newly established, and failing to mobilize any sort of collective action. Most Ghanaian FBOs 
appear to suffer from problems of market access due to conflicts of interest among members. Fewer FBOs 
instead face problems of cohesion due to pervasive shirking among members. These are clearly different 
problems that need to be addressed through different strategies. However, the prevalent policy regarding 
rural organizations in Ghana appears to be mainly directed at addressing problems of cohesion by 
counteracting elite capture (that is, socioeconomic inequality). As a result, access problems are expected 
to continue to increase.  
The recommendation emerging from this study is that to increase collective action, Ghanaian 
cooperative policy needs to be diversified by recognizing that different types of FBOs face different 
problems. In particular, this study identifies four typologies into which FBOs currently operating in rural 
Ghana can be classified. Distinctions are made on the basis of membership structure and rules of conduct, 
revealing the existence of FBOs characterized by (1) homogeneous membership and efficient conduct, (2) 
homogeneous membership and equity-based conduct, (3) heterogeneous membership and efficient 
conduct, and (4) heterogeneous membership and equitable conduct. We argue that structure and conduct 
are well aligned for types 2 and 3, allowing for collective action to materialize. In contrast, structure and 
conduct are misaligned for types 1 and 4, creating collective action problems. While type 1 faces 
problems of cohesion, type 4 suffers from problems of access. To address the much more common 
problem of access policymakers ought to diversify their support for collective action by granting more 
economic incentives, authority, and autonomy to local leaders (that is, allow for some degree of elite 
capture) to reactivate existing FBOs characterized by heterogeneous membership structure and equity-
based conduct. By doing so, Ghanaian FBOs are expected to gain competitiveness in the marketplace, 
which is essential for their sustainable development over time.  
16 
APPENDIX 
Figure A.1—Map of sample sites 
 
Source: Google Latitude.  
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Box A.1—Risk–dictator game 
In this game participants can gain some real money but cannot lose any of their own, as per the “do no 
harm” policy applied by the International Food Policy Research Institute for experiments involving 
human beings. All participants were asked to play the game twice; the first was played with negligible 
amounts of money at stake for demonstration purposes. Each game was played according to the following 
steps: 
1.  Ask each participant to pick one of the following risk options (0–7, Table A.1) and make sure 
they understand the potential gains associated with each option: 
2.  Toss one coin for all participants (the outcome of the coin toss is the same for all 
participants). 
3.  Before handing out the money, ask each participant whether he/she would prefer to share 
his/her payoff equally with the other participants (equity preference) or not (efficiency 
preference). 
4.  Share the payoff according to the equity–efficiency preference indicated by the majority (at 
least two) of the participants. 
Table A.1—Risk options for gaming 
First Game (trial)  Second Game 
Indicator  Heads (lose)  Tails (win)  Indicator  Heads 
(lose) 
Tails (win) 
0  0.5 GHC  0.5 GHC  0  2.5 GHC  2.5 GHC 
1  0.45 GHC  0.95 GHC  1  2.25 GHC  4.75 GHC 
2  0.4 GHC  1.2 GHC  2  2 GHC  6 GHC 
3  0.35 GHC  1.25 GHC  3  1.75 GHC  6.25 GHC 
4  0.3 GHC  1.5 GHC  4  1.5 GHC  7.5 GHC 
5  0.2 GHC  1.6 GHC  5  1 GHC  8 GHC 
6  0.1 GHC  1.9 GHC  6  0.5 GHC  9.5 GHC 
7  0 GHC  2 GHC  7  0 GHC  10 GHC 
Source: Binswanger, 1980. 
Note: GHC = Ghana cedi (US$1 = 1.45 GHC, April 2010).  
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